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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
An early Dakota case held the same way 13 But more
recent analogous decisions indicate a shift toward the pre-
sumption of validity unless the contrary affirmatively appears
in the journals.1
4
The practice and problem of stopping the clock would
vanish without the limit on the length of sessions. As the
volume of business grows with every year, there remains
little reason to deny the legislature the full time to perform
its duties which the executive and judicial branches have
always had.' 5
RICHARD BOARDMAN
EMINENT DOMAIN - REGULATIONS R E L A T I N G T O
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS - COMPENSATION F 0 R L o s s 0 F
ACCESS - In a condemnation proceeding by the New Mexico
Highway Commission the District Court entered a judgment
which compensated an abutting property owner for the
depreciation in market value of undeveloped property caused
by the loss of direct access to a highway, which was the
result of being placed upon a frontage road of a limited access
highway On appeal, the State Supreme Court held, one
justice dissenting, that owners of land abutting a highway
did not sustain a compensable loss by action of the State in
removing their direct access and in providing a frontage road.
State v Danfelser, 348 P.2d 241 (N.M. 1963)
As early as the second half of the 19th century, New York
decisions clearly established a compensable interest in the
right of access of abutting property owners.' It is now
generally recognized that abutting owners have a right of
access to and from public roads which may not be cut off or
interferred with unless justly compensated for 2
13. Treadway v Schnauber, 1 Dak. 227, 46 N.W 464 (1875).
14. State ex rel. Sorlie v. Steen, 55 N.D. 239, 212 N.W 843 (1927) State v.
Schultz, 44 N.D. 269, 174 N.W 81 (1919) Woolfolk v. Albrecht, 22 N.D. 36, 133
N.W 310 (1911) Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W 737 (1901).
15. Orfield, Improving State Legislative Procedure and Processes, 31 MINN.
L. R v. 161 (1946). See also Lloyd, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure,
4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6 (1952).
1. Kane v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891)
Lohr v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887) State v.
New York El. R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
2. E.g., People v. Lipari, 28 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1963) State v. Ensley, 240 Ind.
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Two distinct powers have been used to control the rights
of access; the police power and the power of eminent domain.
Police power is the right of reasonable regulation by the
government clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety,
or morals of the people.3  Eminent domain is the power
to take property for public use. 4  Property taken, injured,
or destroyed under the doctrine of eminent domain is
compensable while the police power is non-compensable even
though it amounts to an actual taking or destruction of
property 5 Under the Fourteenth Amendment property is
protected from any taking not accomplished by due process
of law, but regulations arising from the proper exercise of
the police power 6 do not violate the due process clause.
7
The rights of access of an abutting owner are subject to
two other serious restrictions. An abutting owner has no
right to compensation by reason of the diversion of traffic
away from his property" or the fact that he may be forced
to travel a more circuitous route, so long as that route is
reasonable. 9  Furthermore, where no highway, conventional
or otherwise previously existed, no right of access is created
or exists in an abutting owner's property when a highway is
constructed. 10
Only ten states have clearly passed upon the questions
of whether an abutting owner should be compensated for
injuries due to the loss of access suffered from being placed
upon a frontage road, and these cases fall into three major
categories."
472, 164 N.E.2d 342 (1960) Fougeron v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 753, 119
N.W.2d 298 (1963) Tubular Serv. Corp. v. Com'r of State Highway Dept., N.J.
Super. 556, 187 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1963), Affirmed, 40 N.J. 331, 191 A.2d 745.
3. Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (.1926).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See, e.g., Gear v. City of Phoenix, 93 Ariz. 260, 379. P.2d 972 (1963).
Regulation to avoid the danger of collision with vehicle or pedestrians created
by automobiles backing into traffic from off-street parking places held legiti-
mate and non-compensable. Rayburn v. State, 93 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496 (1963)
Conversion of street abutting property from two-way access road and construc-
tion of traffic island divider preventing left turns into property was held not
compensable Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 154 N.E.2d
814 (1958) cert. denied 360 U.S. 934. Where the establishment of bus stops
hampered the ingress and egress to a filling station it was held to be a reason-
able traffic regulation.
7. Appeal of White, supra note 3.
8. Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
9. State v. Silva, 71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595 (1962).
10. People v. Thomas, 108 Cal. App. 2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952).
11. Covey, Frontage Roads To Compensate Or Not To Compensate, 56
Nw U. L. REV. 587 (1961).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
I. Any loss resulting from being placed on a
frontage road should be compensated in eminent
domain, but the existence of the frontage road should
be considered in mitigation of the loss suffered.1
2
The decisions so holding find that the right of ingress
and egress attaches to the lot and is a right of property as
fully as the lot itself.
1 3
II. Any loss resulting from being placed on a
frontage road should be compensated in eminent
domain only when accompanied by an otherwise
compensable taking of land, and the existence of the
frontage road should be considered in mitigation of
the loss suffered.1
4
The courts reaching this result appear to argue that if no
land has been taken from the abutting owner there can be
no taking within the doctrine of eminent domain. 15
III. Any loss resulting from being placed on the
frontage road should not be compensated in eminent
domain whether land is taken or not.
1 6
The decisions which refuse compensation in all cases
reason that the abutting owner's right of access is to the
public roads system, but not necessarily to express portions
of it.1 7  Therefore, no award is necessary to fulfill the
requirement of just compensation when the abutting owner
has given up nothing of value.'
It is suggested that the construction of controlled access
highways, with frontage roads which grant the abutting owner
access, produce no compensable injuries. Therefore, any
decline in the value of the abutting owner's property is merely
the non-compensable result of a proper exercise of the police
power The damages that the abutting owner suffers are
the same suffered by all public highway users and differ only
in degree. DUANE BRIETLING
12. Id. at 603.
13. People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944) McMoran v.
State, 55 Wash. 2d 37, 345 P.2d 598 (1959).
14. Covey, supra note 11, at 603.
15. State v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) State Highway
Comm'n v. Finch, 237 Miss. 314, 114 So. 2d 673 (1959).
16. Covey, supra note 11, at 603.
17. Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 "owa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755
(1957) Darnall v. State, 108 N.W.2d 201 (S.D. 1961) Nick v. State Highway
Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).
18. Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Filins, 411 Ill. 304, 104 N.E.2d
214 (1952).
[Vol. 40
